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STATEMENT
In compliance with Rule 24(a)( 1), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, it is noted on this page
that the Utah State Division of Commerce, Division of Corporations & Commercial Code
("Division"), was, at times, a party to the proceedings below. The Division was named as a Party
Defendant by Plaintiff early in the proceedings but was later dismissed by the Court under an Order,
dated October 26, 2004. Thereafter, the Division was brought back in as a Third-Party Defendant
under a Third-Party Complaint filed by Wilkinson, but the Division was later dismissed as a ThirdParty Defendant by an Order of the Court, dated November 9, 2005.
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IN THE UTAH COURT O F APPEALS

DONALD E. TERRY,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
WILKINSON FARM SERVICE COMPANY,
Defendant/Appellee.

Case No. 20060855

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an Appeal from a final Order denying Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment and
granting Appellee's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction
because original appellate jurisdiction in the Utah Supreme Court, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated,
§78-2-2(3)(j), has been transferred to the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, §78-22(4).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Issue No. 1:

Did the Trial Court commit error in concluding that current Utah statutory
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law (1992 Revised Utah Business Corporation Act) was determinative as to the legal status of
Appellee, and that, therefore, Appellant was required to exhaust administrative remedies and failed
to do so?
Standard of Review:

The Appellate Court grants no deference to the District Court's

Conclusions of Law and reviews them for correctness. [Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56; Grvnberg
vs. Ouestar Pipeline Company (2003), 70 P.3rd, Page 1; 469 Utah Advanced Reports, Page 13; 2003
Utah, 8, rehearing denied; Waddoups vs. Amalgamated Sugar Company (2002), 54 P.3rd, 1054,452,
Utah Advanced Reports, Page 58; 2002 Utah, Page 69, rehearing denied.]
Issue No. 2: Did the Trial Court commit error in concluding that the "doctrine of laches"
is applicable in this case?
Standard of Review:

The Appellate Court grants no deference to the District Court's

Conclusions of Law and reviews them for correctness. [Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56; Grvnberg
vs. Ouestar Pipeline Company (2003), 70 P.3rd, Page 1; 469 Utah Advanced Reports, Page 13; 2003
Utah, 8 rehearing denied; Waddoups vs. Amalgamated Sugar Company (2002), 54 P.3rd, 1054; 452,
Utah Advanced Reports, Page 58; 2002 Utah, Page 69, rehearing denied.]
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Statutes:

Portions of Utah Revised Business Corporation Act (1992 Act) and previous

Utah Business Corporation Act (1961), namely, §16-10a-1701 ofRevisedAct; §16-10a-1704(l)of
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Revised Act; §16-10a-128(3) of Revised Act; §16-10-100 of previous Utah Business Corporation
Act; § 16-10-101(3) of previous Utah Business Corporation Act; Article 3, Title 16 (Dissolution) of
previous Utah Business Corporation Act; Declaratory Judgment Act, §78-33-1, §78-33-2 and §7833-12; also, Administrative Procedures Act, §63-46b-14(2).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of Case:
In 2002, Appellant (hereinafter sometimes referred to as "Terry"), by inheritance, became
owner of one (1) share of stock in the Appellee (hereinafter sometimes referred to as "Wilkinson")
company. Thereafter, Terry entered into discussions with Wilkinson concerning a buyout of his
minority ownership interest. As negotiations continued, Terry believed he was not getting a fair
value for his stock. During this process, Terry learned through his own research that Wilkinson's
original Articles of Incorporation and charter, approved by the State of Utah November 1, 1927,
placed a limit on the "duration" of Wilkinson at fifty (50) years.
In February 2003, Terry made demand upon Wilkinson that, because of its expired status,
it wind up its affairs, make an accounting, pay its creditors and distribute any net equity to Terry and
other shareholders. Instead, in March 2003, at the invitation of the Division of Corporations
(hereinafter sometimes referred to as "Division") Wilkinson filed Amended and Restated Articles
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of Incorporation, which Articles were thereafter approved by said Division purporting to make
Wilkinson's existence perpetual.
As the process referred to in the next proceeding paragraph was unfolding, Terry, through
counsel, communicated with the Division his objection to the process, advising the Division that,
if it continued to concur with Wilkinson's position as to corporate status, a Declaratory Judgment
would likely follow. In response, the Division took the position that, because Wilkinson "presumed
they had perpetual duration", the Division was accepting their submitted April 2003 Amendment.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Trial Court:
A declaratory action followed. The Division was later joined as a Party Defendant and then
dismissed by Terry. Thereafter, they were brought back into the case by Wilkinson as a Third-Party
Defendant and later dismissed by the Court. Ultimately, Terry and Wilkinson presented CrossMotions for Summary Judgment. Following Oral Argument, the Trial Court issued its Ruling in the
form of the Order herein appealed, dated August 24, 2006, denying Terry's Motion and granting
Wilkinson's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. As part of its Order, the Trial Court also granted
a separate Motion by Wilkinson to strike an Affidavit that had been filed by Terry in support of his
original Motion. In granting Wilkinson's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, the Trial Court
concluded that:
1.

Terry was required to, and failed to, exhaust administrative remedies before filing his

4
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Declaratory Judgment action. The Court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the
declaratory action because of this failure on Terry's part.
2.

The Court also concluded that, even assuming it had jurisdiction, the "doctrine of

laches" was applicable to this case, given the factual history, as contained in the Court file. Based
on laches, the Court ruled that equity should prevent Terry from going forward.
It is from the Court's Order denying Terry's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting
Wilkinson's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment that this appeal is taken.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
In 2002, Terry inherited one (1) share of stock in Wilkinson. This share of stock had been
inherited from his mother, LaVaun W. Terry. LaVaun W. Terry's father was S. C. Wilkinson, an
incorporator and President of Wilkinson at its inception in 1927. Lorraine Burdett, the current
President of Wilkinson, is another daughter of S. C. Wilkinson and the sister of Terry's mother,
LaVaun W. Terry.
Wilkinson was organized and incorporated in 1927. Its original Articles of Incorporation and
charter placed a limitation of fifty (50) years on Wilkinson's duration. Terry first learned that
Wilkinson's charter had expired by its terms in early 2003 while trying to negotiate a buyout of his
inherited share. He came to believe that the only way he could get fair value for his interest was to
force a liquidation and a winding up of company affairs. In March 2003, at the invitation of the
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Division, Wilkinson filed Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation purporting to make its
existence "perpetual", which document was thereafter approved by the Division.
Wilkinson filed an Affidavit of Lorraine Burdett in support of its Counter-Motion for
Summary Judgment, wherein it was disclosed that Terry's mother, LaVaun W. Terry, was, at one
time, a Vice President of Wilkinson. Of equal importance from a factual standpoint, are the letters
that were exchanged at the time the Division invited Wilkinson to file Amendments to their Articles.
On March 14, 2003, Kathy Berg, on behalf of the Division, sent a letter to Wilkinson inviting them
to "cure" the problem by submitting an Amendment, making their existence perpetual. Ms. Berg
also sent a letter to Terry's counsel explaining the Division's position. In both letters, the Division
excused the predicament by referencing the fact that, following 1977, it had unwittingly sent annual
report forms to Wilkinson, and Wilkinson had unwittingly filled them out and filed them. [See
Exhibit "A" letters in Addendum.] Everyone "presumed" they were legal. Also, note the factual
position that Wilkinson took when they wanted the Division to be part of the litigation. In its
Memorandum in support of a Motion to Dismiss Terry's original Complaint for failure to join the
Division as an indispensable party, Wilkinson argued that they (Wilkinson) historically believed in
their legality, because they and the Division continued to exchange annual report forms, and the
Division listed them as in "good standing" on the Division's records.
The Trial Court characterized the above circumstances by finding "that the principals in the
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corporation, including Plaintiffs predecessor-in-interest, had knowledge, actual or imputed, that its
charter had expired in 1977 and, yet, because they continued to receive and file annual renewals with
the Division, understood and believed they had a sort of "de facto" existence."
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ARGUMENT NO. 1
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN
APPLYING CURRENT LAW [1992 REVISED BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT]
TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE
In Wilkinson's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, it did not contest the fact that its
charter had expired in November 1977. Rather, it argued, and the Court accepted, the argument that,
because current law (Utah Code Annotated, §16-10a-128) empowers the Division to make
conclusive determinations as to corporate status, and, because the Division in this case not only
treated Wilkinson as "legal" but also invited it to "cure" its problem through Amendments to its
Articles, that, therefore, such treatment by the Division is conclusive.
From that premise, Wilkinson then argued, and the Court accepted, that, under current law,
Terry was required to challenge this determination by the Division by proceeding under the Utah
Administrative Procedure's Act. [Utah Code Annotated, §63-46b-14(2).] Having failed to do so,
the Court ruled that it was without jurisdiction to consider Terry's claims.
The Court erred. Terry acknowledges that, under present Utah statutory law (in effect since
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1992), the Division has initial, conclusive authority to determine corporate status. Terry also
acknowledges that, under current law, the Division also has exclusive authority to administratively
dissolve a corporation for, among other things, "because its period of duration has expired". [Utah
Code Annotated, §16-10a-1420(5).] But the analysis and conclusion by the Court is based upon a
couple of false premises, namely: (1) That Wilkinson was a viable corporation in 2003 when the
Division accepted its Amended Articles; and (2) that the Revised Business Corporation Act, enacted
in 1992, applies in this case. It is Terry's position that Wilkinson was not a viable corporation in
2003, having suffered "corporate death" after November 1977 as a matter of law. In addition, the
1992 Revised Act is not the statutory law applicable in this case, as the present Act only applies to
corporations "in existence" on July 1,1992. [See Utah Code Annotated, §16-10a-170L] The 1992
Revised Act also has "savings provisions", saving the operation of prior statutes and rights affixed
or accruing prior to the repeal of the previous statute. In summary, this case must be decided by the
law in effect in 1977, not 1992. Administrative appeal of the action taken by the Division in 2003
was unnecessary based on the statutory case law in effect in 1977.
The 1992 Act requires administrative action in order to dissolve a corporation whose charter
has expired. [Utah Code Annotated, § 16-10a-1420(5).] In other words, if Wilkinson had been a legal
and viable corporation in 1992, with a charter that thereafter expired, the Division would have had
taken administrative action in order to dissolve them, and the Court's analysis concerning
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conclusiveness of their determination and the need for administrative review of their determination
would be correct. But, the fact of the matter is that Wilkinson was not a legal corporation in 1992,
as its existence had dissolved as a matter of law with the expiration of its charter in 1977.
Under the old statute, the Attorney General's Office was required to initiate Court action in
order to dissolve corporations that had failed to comply with administrative procedures or in cases
where there were other violations resulting in "involuntary dissolution". [Utah Code Annotated, §1610-89 (1972).] Absent from the former statute was language requiring a Court to pronounce
"involuntary dissolution" based upon a corporation's charter having expired. This supports Terry's
argument that the older statute recognized that corporate status terminates as a matter of law by
reason of the expiration of its charter, without the necessity of Attorney General action and Court
Order.
What then is Wilkinson's status after November 21,1977, under the statutory and case law
in existence at that time? Terry submits that Wilkinson suffered "civil and corporate death" from,
and after, that date and belated attempts to reinstate its corporate life are void and of no force and
effect.
"A corporation is automatically dissolved on the expiration of the period for which
it was created, without any direct action on the part of the state or the members of the
corporation. It has no further existence, either de jure or de facto." [19 Am. Jur. 2nd
Corporations, §2737.]
"After the expiration of a period of an existence specified in the charter of a
9
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corporation, it becomes incapable of exercising any powers, except those which may have
been conferred upon it by statute for the purpose of winding up its affairs." [ 19 Am. Jur. 2nd
Corporations, §2883.]
In 1957, Utah's corporate statute was amended and, for the first time, Utah law allowed
perpetual duration. [Utah Laws, 1957, Chapter 23.] An article in the Utah Law Review, written that
same year, pointed out that, despite the change in law now permitting perpetual duration, many new
filings still contain limitations on duration. The article noted:
"No explanation for this limitation seems possible, other than the fact that lawyers
were not cognizant of the change authorized by the legislature." With the arbitrary limit thus
imposed on the life of a corporation carried no legal significance, this oversight could be
dismissed as harmless. The fact is, however, that the limitation has major implications. The
significance of these can be appreciated when it is recognized that many Courts have held
a corporation ceases to exist, even de facto, once its charter has expired." [Quoting from
Fletcher on Corporations, §3842]; [7 Utah Law Review, Page 13 (1957).]
In summary, the Trial Court applied the wrong statute, because Wilkinson did not exist in
1992 to benefit from the procedures afforded in the new statute for dissolving corporations, including
those whose charters had expired. The correct analysis under the old statute results in Wilkinson
suffering "corporate death" as a matter of law and having no existence after 1977.
ARGUMENT NO. 2
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN
APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF "LACHES" IN THIS CASE
The Trial Court concluded that the long delay by Terry and his predecessor-in-interest,
LaVaun W. Terry, in raising the issue of Wilkinson's status, now precludes Terry from relief under
10
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the equitable doctrine of "laches". In reaching this conclusion, the Court found "actual or imputed"
knowledge concerning the corporation's 1977 charter expiration. But the Court also found, however,
that, at the time the aforesaid charter expired and in subsequent years, "the principals in the
corporation, including Plaintiffs predecessor-in-interest... understood and believed they had a sort
of de facto existence." [Emphasis ours.]
As indicated, the statutory and case law in effect in 1977 recognized that corporations with
expired charters had neither de jure or de facto existence but, instead, suffered "corporate death" by
operation of law and without the need for dissolution by administrative or judicial action. In other
words if, in applying the correct law, Wilkinson suffered corporate death and ceased to exist after
November 1977 (except for winding up), then the belief by the principals (including Terry's
predecessor-in-interest) in some sort of "de facto" existence was mistaken.
In order to "successfully assert laches one must establish that (1) plaintiff unreasonably
delayed in bringing an action, and (2) defendants were prejudiced by that delay." rNeilson-Newev
and Company vs. Utah Resources Intl., 905 P.2d 312, 314 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).]
In our case, the Trial Court reached a conclusion that Terry unreasonably delayed his action,
despite finding that his predecessor-in-interest and other principals in the corporation always
believed they had some kind of legal existence. Terry submits that this finding cannot support the
conclusion that he "unreasonably" delayed bringing his action. It shows that his predecessor-in-

11
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interest and the other principals in the company were acting under a mistaken belief that they had
some sort of de facto existence. The delay in this case was not ''unreasonable" given the mistake that
they shared.
In Goodman vs. Lee, 76 Federal 3rd 1007 (Fifth Circuit 1996), the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals was considering a laches defense to a Declaratory Judgment action brought by the co-author
of the rock classic "Let the Good Times Roll". The Defendants in the case were heirs of the other
co-author. Plaintiff had delayed seeking relief from 1956 to 1984, and the defense claimed that
laches should apply. The jury had found Plaintiffs delay was excused, because the original
copyright failed to list her as a co-author, and she otherwise was not aware, and could not have been
aware, of the problem. In affirming the Trial Court award, the Appeals Court stated:
"The Lees cannot establish that the delay by Goodman in filing her action was in
excusable." [At page 1014.]
The facts in this case are even more compelling. No one, it seems, was aware of the legal
consequences of Wilkinson's charter expiring in 1977. Everyone assumed that the company
continued to have some sort of legal standing. This mutual, but mistaken, understanding was not
unreasonable given the fact that the Division continued to treat Wilkinson as a viable corporation.
For the foregoing reasons, Terry's delay is excusable, and laches is not a defense.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above-stated, Terry requests that this Court reverse the Trial Court and
12
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remand the case with instructions for the Trial Court to enter a Judgment in favor of Appellant upon
his Declaratory Judgment Complaint.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/V

day of February, 2007.

(fauXdujn./%iu~
MICHAEL F. OLMSTEAD
Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of
Appellant to H. THOMAS STEYENSON, Attorney for Appellee, 3986 Washington Boulevard,
Ogden, Utah, 84403, thi§
/. %&m of February, 2007.

Secretary
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MICHAEL F. OLMSTEAD [2455]
Attorney for Plaintiff
2650 Washington Boulevard, Suite 102
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone (801) 625-0960
Facsimile (801) 621-0035

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

DONALD E. TERRY,

ORDER

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 030906753

vs.

WILKINSON FARM SERVICE COMPANY,
Defendant.

Judge MICHAEL D. LYON

This matter came before the Court on a regularly scheduled hearing; Plaintiff was represented
by his counsel of record, MICHAEL F. OLMSTEAD, Esquire; Defendant was represented by its
counsel of record, H. THOMAS STEVENSON, Esquire; the Court having reviewed the briefs filed
by the parties, and having heard arguments and representations of counsel, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied.

2.

For the reasons set forth in Defendant's Motion, Defendant's Motion to Strike

Affidavit is hereby granted.

Order
Civil No. 030906753

3.

Having concluded there are no material issues of fact and for the following reasons,

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted:
a.

The Division of Commerce ("Division") has determined that Defendant corporation

is a corporation in good standing.

Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, §16-10a-128, this

determination is "conclusive evidence" as to the corporation's legal standing. Moreover, because
Plaintiff was notified of the Division's determination, as evidenced by correspondence between the
Division and Plaintiffs counsel, Plaintiff was aware of the Division's determination and failed to
appeal said determination administratively. As a result, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, §63-46b14(2), Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Accordingly, this Court lacks
jurisdiction to further consider the matter.
b.

Assuming the Court does have jurisdiction, this Court finds that the principals in the

corporation, including Plaintiffs predecessor-in-interest, had knowledge, actual or imputed, that its
charter had expired in 1977 and, yet, because they continued to receive and file annual renewals with
the Division, understood and believed they had a sort of "defacto" existence.
From the foregoing finding, the Court concludes that the "doctrine of latches" is applicable
in this case. The Court concludes that there has been unreasonable delay in challenging corporate
existence since 1977 when the Defendant's charter expired. The Court further finds that the
Defendant corporation has been prejudiced by the long and unreasonable delay in making this

2

Order
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challenge.

MC

DATED and signed this<

day of August, 2006.
BY THE COURT:
/

MICHAEL D. LYON, District Court Judge
Entered:

f,\/?/fa

APPROVED AS TO FORM

H. THOMAS«TEVENSON
Attorney for Defendant
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EXHIBIT "A"

i\^-o

Department of Commerce
TED BOYER
Executive Director

KLAREBACHMAN
Deputy Director

KATHY BERG
Corporations & UCC Division Director

MICHAEL O.LEAVITT
Governor
OLENE S. WALKER
Lieutenant Governor
14 March 2003
Lorraine W. Burdett
Wilkinson Farm Service Company
2637 West 1800 South
West Haven, Utah 84401
Re: Duration of Wilkinson Farm Service Company, a Utah corporation
Dear Ms. Burdett:
You are listed as the current registered agent for the above mentioned corporation and as
such are receiving this letter. When Wilkinson Farm Service Company was incorporated on 21
November 1927, the original articles of incorporation listed a duration of 50 years. In 1960 the
Utah Corporations Act was passed and in that act there was a provision allowing a perpetual
duration for corporations.
As the Utah Division of Corporations and Commercial Code has evolved to a computer
system, the duration of corporations is not listed and all are treated perpetual unless a specific
expiration is listed. I have investigated the issue and can find no evidence of your corporation
having changed their duration to perpetual, thus your corporation should have expired in 1977.
However, you have continued to receive annual reports and have continued to file those annual
reports.
We are happy to help you resolve this issue. Within 30 days of the date of this letter,
please send us evidence of any filing or document that shows the corporation changed its duration
to perpetual. If no document exists, please send an amendment to your articles of incorporation
making such a change. If indeed, the corporation did intend to expire in 1977, please send me a
letter stating that fact and we will expire the corporation immediately.
Please contact our office you have further comments or questions.
Glad to be of service,

^iduf

f^eA^\

Kathy Berg
Division Director

Cc:

Michael F. Olmstead
2650 Washington Blvd, Suite 102
Ogden,Utah 8440

7

Utah!

South, Box 146705, Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6705- Telephone (801) 530-4849 • Facsimile (801) 530-6438 • www.commerce.utah.gov

MICHAEL F. OLMSTEAD
Attorney at Law
2650 Washington Boulevard, Suite 102
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone 801-625-0960

Facsimile 801-621-0035

April 7,2003

Utah State Department of Commerce
Division of Corporations and Commercial Codes
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
ATTENTION: Kathy Berg, Director
Re:

Wilkinson Farm Service Company/Corporate Status
Entity No. 556727-0142
Registration Date: November 2 J, 1927
Expiration Date: Noverrtber 21, 1977

Dear Ms. Berg:
I received a copy of your letter to Lorraine W. Burdett, dated March 14, 2003, suggesting
that this company has continued to have some kind of legal status, even though its corporate
charter expired in 1977, and that the company can avoid dissolution by filing an Amendment to its
Articles of Corporation, making its duration perpetual. The purpose of this letter is to address
this position and to advise you that my client strongly disagrees
You are likely reviewing Wilkinson's situation in the context of the present statute (§1610a-1420, 1421 and 1422, Revised Business Corporation Act) in concluding that corporations
whose charters expire under the statute continue to exist until administratively dissolved by the
division. This is arguably true, as to those corporations which had a legal existence at the time of
the adoption of the present Act in 1992, but whose charters thereafter expired, since those
corporations would have benefit of the new law, which suggests they continue to exist until
administratively dissolved by the division.

-rl

Utah State Department ofCommerce
April 7, 2003
Page 2

The current law was not in effect in 1977 when Wilkinson's charter expired. At that time,
Utah was operating under the Model Business Corporation Act, which had been adopted in 1961.
Under that Act, expiration of a corporate charter was not included as a ground for administrative
dissolution (as it is in the present Act) because the law, at that time and for decades prior thereto,
stood for the principle that such corporations automatically dissolve and, thereafter, have neither
"dejure" or "de facto" existence. They continue only for the purpose of winding up. (See
5 Thompson Corporations, §6651; 19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations. §2737.) Applying the thenexisting law to the instant case means that Wilkinson had no 'de jure"' or "de facto" existence
after 1977 and, certainly, not when the present Act was adopted in 1992.
Finally, I would point out that any attempt to salvage this company under the Revised Act
would run afoul of Article XH, Section 3, of the Utah Constitution. In Keetchvs Cordner. 62
P.2d 273 (Utah 1936), the Utah Supreme Court noted that this section prohibits any legislation
that extends a charter or remits the forfeiture of any corporate charter. Wilkinson's charter was
"forfeited" after November 21, 1977 The 1992 Revised Act cannot constitutionally remit,
release or cancel that forfeiture.
If you have not already done so, please run this issue by the Attorney General's Office for
their opinion and advice. If you do not change course on this matter, I predict that a declaratory
judgment action will follow.
Please advise.
Very truly yours,

MICHAEL F. OLMSTEAD
MFO/rm
cc:

Donald E. Terry
H. Thomas Stevenson, Esquire
Jeffrey S. Buckner, Assistant Attorney General
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22 April 2003
Michael F. 01mstead
2650 Washington Blvd. Suite 102
Ogden, Utah 84401
Re:

Wilkinson Farm Service Company, Inc

Dear Mr* Olmstead:
1 have reviewed your letter dated 7 April 2 003 and you state
some concern about the status of Wilkinson Farm Service
Company, Inc.(Wilkinson), a Utah corporation number 5567270142.
Wilkinson was registered on 21 November 1927 and stated a
duration of fifty years in the original
articles of
incorporation.
Subsequent changes to the corporations act
ultimately
resulted
in
the
availability
of
perpetual
duration.
Wilkinson presumed they had that perpetual
duration; they continued to file annual reports and the
division continued to send them.
On 14 April 2003, Wilkinson filed Amended and Restated
Articles of Incorporation to formally reflect this perpetual
duration. The division has accepted and filed that document.
Please contact me if you have further questions or comments.
Respectfully*

Kathy Berg
Division Director

East 300 South, Bo* 146705, Salt Late City, UT 84114-6705* telephone (801) 530-4849 • facsimile (801) 530-6433 • www commerceMtoh.gov
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most current mailing addresses appearing on the records of the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code. The notice of suspension shall be mailed by certified
or registered mail. The certificate of dissolution may be mailed by regular mail.
History: C 1953, 16-10-88 2, enacted by L
1985, ch 178, § 57
16-10-88.5.

Repealed.

Repeal.
Section 16-10-88 5 (L 1973, ch 20, § 1, 1977,
ch 58, §1, 1979, ch 57, §10, 1984, ch 66,

§ 112, 1984 (2nd S S ), ch 15, § 34), relating to
suspension of corporation for delinquencies,
was repealed by Laws 1985, ch 178, § 72

16-10-89. Involuntary dissolution — Grounds. A corporation may be dissolved
involuntarily by a decree of the district court in an action filed by the attorney
general when it is established that
(a) The corporation procured its articles of incorporation through fraud, or
(b) The corporation has continued to exceed or abuse the authority conferred
upon it by law
History: L 1961, ch 28, § 89,1973, ch 20,
§2
Compiler's Notes.
The 1973 amendment deleted provisions for
dissolution where corporation has failed to

file its annual report, where corporation
powers, rights and privileges have been suspended, and where the corporation has failed
to appoint and maintain a registered agent in
the state

16-10-90. Involuntary dissolution — Notification to attorney general. The
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code shall certify annually to the attorney general the names of all corporations which have given any cause for dissolution under Section 16-10-89 The Division of Corporations and Commercial Code
shall concurrently mail to the corporation at its registered office a notice that such
certification has been made. Upon the receipt of such certification, the attorney
general shall file an action in the name of the state against such corporation for
its dissolution
History: L 1961, ch 28, § 90, 1973, ch 20,
§ 3,1984, ch 66, § 113
Compiler's Notes.
The 1973 amendment deleted provisions
relating to the certification by the secretary
of state of corporations which have failed to

file annual reports and to the abatement of
actions upon filing by the corporation
The 1984 amendment substituted "Division
of Corporations and Commercial Code" for
"secretary of state" in the first two sentences

16-10-91. Involuntary dissolution — Venue and process — Notice. Every
action for the involuntary dissolution of a corporation under sections 16-10-89 and
16-10-90 shall be commenced by the attorney general by filing a complaint in the
district court of the county in which the registered office of the corporation is situated and summons shall issue and be served If the summons is returned not served
after three attempts have been made to serve the corporation at its registered
office address or at any other address known to or readily ascertainable by the
attorney general, the attorney general shall cause publication to be made in some
newspaper published in or having a general circulation in the county where the
registered office of the corporation is situated, containing a notice of the pendency
of such action, the title of the court, the title of the action, and the date on or
after which default may be entered The notice shall be published at least once
each week for two successive weeks, and the first publication of it may begin at
any time after the summons has been returned The attorney general shall cause
63
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assets distributed to its shareholders, or in case its property and assets
are not sufficient to satisfy and discharge such costs, expenses, debts and
obligations, all the property and assets have been applied so far as they
will go to their payment, the court shall enter a decree dissolving the
corporation, whereupon the existence of the corporation shall cease.
History: I*. 1961, ch. 28, § 97.

16-10-98. Piling of decree of dissolution.—In case the court shall enter
a decree dissolving a corporation, it shall be the duty of the clerk of such
court to cause a certified copy of the decree to be filed with the secretary
of state. No fee shall be charged by the secretary of state for the filing
thereof.
History: L. 1961, ch. 28, § 98.

16-10-99. Deposit with state treasurer of assets due unknown creditor
or shareholder.—Upon the voluntary or involuntary dissolution of a corporation, the portion of the assets distributable to a creditor or shareholder
who is unknown or cannot be found, or who is under disability, and there
is no person legally competent to receive such distributive portion, shall
be reduced to cash and deposited with the state treasurer to be held and disposed of by him in accordance with the provisions of the Utah Unclaimed
Property Act.
History: L. 1961, ch. 28, § 99.

Cross-Reference.
Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed P r o p erty Act, 78 44-1 et seq.

16-10-100. Survival of remedy after dissolution.—The dissolution of a
corporation either (1) by the issuance of a certificate of dissolution by the
secretary of state, or (2) by a decree of court when the court has not liquidated the assets and business of the corporation as provided in this act,
or (3) by expiration of its period of duration, shall not take away or impair
any remedy available to or against the corporation, its directors, officers,
or shareholders, for any right or claim existing, or any liability incurred,
prior to such dissolution if action or other proceeding thereon is commenced
within two years after the date of such dissolution. Any such action or
proceeding by or against the corporation may be prosecuted or defended
by the corporation in its corporate name. The shareholders, directors and
officers shall have power to take such corporate or other action as shall
be appropriate to protect such remedy, right or claim. If such corporation
was dissolved by the expiration of its period of duration, such corporation
may amend its articles of incorporation at any during such period
of two years so as to extend its period of duration.
History: I* 1961, ch. 28, § 100.
Quiet title action.
A dissolved corporation may maintain
an action to quiet title. Falconaero Enterprise, Inc. v. Valley I n v e s t m e n t C o ,
16 U. (2d) 77, 395 P . 2d 915.

CoUateral Keferences.
Corporations<£=>630(2).
19 C.J.S. Corporations § 1775
19 Am. J u r . 2d 1014, 1018, Corporations
§§ 1669, 1673.
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against dissolved corporation, 40 A. L. E .
2d 1396.
Service of process upon dissolved do-

16-10-101

mestic corporation in absence of express
statutory direction, 75 A. L. R. 2d 1399.

16-10-101. Continuation of corporate existence to wind up after dissolution.—Notwithstanding the dissolution of a corporation either (1) by the
issuance of a certificate of dissolution by the secretary of state, or (2) by a
decree of court, or (3) by expiration of its period of duration, the corporate existence of such corporation shall nevertheless continue for the
purpose of winding up its affairs in respect to any property and assets
which have not been distributed or otherwise disposed of prior to such
dissolution, and to effect such purpose such corporation may sell or otherwise dispose of such property and assets, sue and be sued, contract, and
exercise all other incidental and necessary powers.
History: L. 1961, ch. 28, § 101.
Cross-Reference.
Remission of forfeiture, Const. Art. X I I ,
§3.
Effect of dissolution.
Even though corporation was suspended
for failure to pay franchise taxes and
thus was placed under some disabilities,
t h e suspension did not prevent i t from
maintaining suit for negligence. Maekay
& Knobel Enterprises, Inc. v. Teton Van
Gas, Inc., 23 U. (2d) 200, 460 P . 2d 828.
CoUateral References.
Corporations<§^>618.
19 C.J.S. Corporations §§ 1728, 1743.
19 Am. J u r . 2d 1015, Corporations
§ 1669.
Arbitration proceedings, dissolved corporation's power to participate in, 71 A. L.
R. 2d 1121.
Criminal proceedings, maintainability
against dissolved corporation, 40 A. L. R.
2d 1396.
Dissolution of corporate lessee as affecting lease, 147 A. L. R. 360.
Dissolution of corporation on ground of

intracorporate deadlock or dissension, 13
A. L. R. 2d 1260.
Dissolution of corporation which executed mortgage, or purchased property subject to it, 128 A. L. R. 572.
Personal liability on contract made b y
" t r u s t e e " or others in closing affairs of
dissolved corporation, 76 A. L. R. 1478.
Power of corporation after expiration or
foifeiture of i t s charter and effects of dissolution, 47 A. L. R. 1288, 97 A. L. R. 477.
Power of equity to appoint receiver for,
or wind up, solvent corporation at instance
of stockholders, on ground of fraud, mismanagement or dissension, 43 A. L. R.
242, 61 A. L. R. 1212, 91 A. L. R. 665.
Reinstatement of repealed, forfeited, expired, or suspended corporate charter as
validating acts i n interim, 13 A. L. R. 2d
1220.
Right of corporation to prefer creditors,
19 A. L. R. 320, 38 A. L. R. 90, 48 A. L. R.
479, 56 A. I/. R. 207, 62 A. L. R. 738.
Right of receiver or other liquidator of
insolvent corporation to recover back payments improperly made during receivership or liquidation, 105 A. L. R. 1519.
Waiver or limitation b y contract between stockholders of their statutory right
to cause dissolution of corporation, 154
A. L. R. 269.

D E C I S I O N S U N D E R FORMER L A W
Authority of directors.
Board of directors in winding up affairs
of corporation on forfeiture of its charter
had authority to confess judgment on indebtedness of corporation. Henriod v. E a s t
Tintic Development Co., 52 U. 245, 173
P. 134.
Duty of directors.
Where corporation's charter was forfeited, it was duty of directors, who were
trustees for s t o c k h o l d e r and creditors, to
assemble its assets, liquidate i t s indebted-

ness, and generally conduct its affairs in
such manner as would properly expedite
winding up of corporation's business.
Houston v. U t a h L a k e Land, Water &
Power Co., 55 U. 393, 187 P . 174, 47
A. L. R. 1282.
Effect of dissolution.
Where charter of corporation was forfeited for failure to pay license tax, it
could not subsequently purchase stock »f
another corporation and engage in business t h a t was beyond scope of i t s power
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(b) in t h e case of a court order or decree pursuant to
Section 16-10a-1008, t h a t the court order or decree was
entered by a court having jurisdiction of the proceeding
for t h e reorganization of t h e corporation under a specified
s t a t u t e of t h e United States.
1992
16-10a-124. C o r r e c t i n g filed d o c u m e n t s .
(1) A domestic or foreign corporation may correct a docum e n t filed with t h e division if the document:
(a) contains an incorrect statement; or
(b) was defectively executed, attested, sealed, verified,
or acknowledged.
J
(2) A document is corrected by delivering to t h e division for
filing articles of correction that:
(a) describe the document, including its filing date, or
h a v e a copy of it attached to t h e articles of correction;
(b) specify the incorrect s t a t e m e n t and t h e reason it is
incorrect or the manner in which the execution, attestation, sealing, verification, or acknowledgement was defective; and
1
(c) correct the incorrect statement or defective execution, attestation, sealing, verification, or acknowledgement.
(3) Articles of correction may be executed by any person
designated in Section 16-10a-120(6), or by any person who
executed the document t h a t is corrected.
(4) Articles of correction are effective on t h e effective date of
t h e document they correct except as to persons relying on the
uncorrected document and adversely affected by the correction. As to those persons, articles of correction are effective
when filed.
1992

5^1

16-10a-125. F i l i n g d u t y of d i v i s i o n .
(1) If a document delivered to t h e division for filing satisfies
t h e requirements of Section 16-10a-120, t h e division shall file
it.
(2) The division files a document by stamping or otherwise
endorsing "Filed" together with the n a m e of the division and
t h e d a t e and time of acceptance for filing on both the document
and t h e accompanying copy. After filing a document, except as
provided in Sections 16-10a-503, 16-10a-1510, and 16-10a1608, t h e division shall deliver the accompanying copy, with
t h e receipt for any filing fees, to t h e domestic or foreign
corporation for which the filing is made, or its representative,
a t t h e address indicated on t h e filing, or at t h e address the
division determines to be appropriate.
(3) If t h e division refuses to file a document, it shall return
t h e document to the person requesting t h e filing within ten
days after the document was delivered to t h e division, together with a written notice providing a brief explanation of
t h e reason for the refusal.
(4) The division's duty to file documents under this section
is ministerial. Except as otherwise specifically provided in this
chapter, t h e division's filing or refusal to file a document does
not:
(a) affect t h e validity or invalidity of the document in
whole or part;
(b) relate to the correctness or incorrectness of information contained in the document; or
(c) create a presumption t h a t the document is valid or
invalid or t h a t information contained in the document is
correct or incorrect.
1992
16-10a-126. A p p e a l from division's refusal t o file document.
(1) If t h e division refuses to file a document delivered to it
for filing, t h e domestic or foreign corporation for which the
filing was requested, or its representative, within 30 days
after t h e effective date of the notice of refusal given by the
division p u r s u a n t to Subsection 16-10a-125(3), may appeal the

refusal to the district court of t h e county where the corpora
tion's principal office is or will be located, or if there is none in ; M
this state, the county where its registered office is or will be ^ 9
located. The appeal is commenced by petitioning the court tgH i i
compel the filing of the document and by attaching to the
petition a copy of the document and the division's notice rtf
refusal.
(2) The court may summarily order the division to file the
document or take other action the court considers appropriate
(3) The court's final decision may be appealed as irr any
other civil proceedings.
? I99 *
16-10a-127. E v i d e n t i a r y effect of c o p y of filed docu
ment.
p^
A certificate attached to a copy of a document filed by the
division, or an endorsement, seal, or s t a m p placed on the^mnr /M*%i
which certificate, endorsement, seal, or stamp bears thej$fgl : \ J ^
n a t u r e of the director of the division, or a
racsimile^1|ihg^^
director's signature, and the seal of the division, is concl§ifv#T ^
evidence that the original document h a s been filed with*tke^
division.
A||Ji *
16-10a-128. Certificates i s s u e d b y t h e division. > g^L< - i
(1) Anyone may apply to the division for a certific||e 0{J S '
existence for a domestic corporation, a certificate of aiitorf.^ f)
zation for a foreign corporation, or a certificate t h a t setsfefli^;^
any facts of record in the office of the division.
3 ^ f "? ?
(2) A certificate of existence or authorization sets fojIScr
^^H
(a) the domestic corporation's corporate name^dff the^
foreign corporation's corporate name registered *"
state;
(b) that:
(i) the domestic corporation is duly incofp
under the law of this state and the da£f|
incorporation; or
(ii) the foreign corporation is authorized to £j*ai5|*^
act bus iness in this state;
Mfe.\
(c) that all fees, taxes, and penalties owed to t^j
have been paid, if:
(i) payment is reflected in t h e records of
sion; and
(ii) nonpayment affects the existence or aui
tion of the domestic or foreign corporation;
(d) that its most recent annual report reqi
Section 16-10a-160 7 has been filed by the division^.^
(e) t h a t articles of dissolution have not been Sleof
(f) other facts of record in the office of the divii
may be requested by the applicant.
(3) Subject to any qualification stated in the certil
certificate issued by t h e division may be relied if]
conclusive evidence of the facts set forth in the certiffo
16-10a-129. P e n a l t y for s i g n i n g false document!
(1) A person commits an offense if he signs a cbf
knowing it to be false in any material respect, with inij
the document be delivered to t h e division for filings*
(2) An offense under this section is a class A m i s d |
punishable by a fine not to exceed $2,500.
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16-10a-201. Incorporators.
ZJLst&h a
One or more persons may act as incorporators of
&f®0^^^M
tion by delivering to t h e division for filing articles ^ ^ v f t g « J f*Web<
requirements of Section 16-10a-202. An incorporator/wW* . . j
natural person must be at least 18 years old.
*^§Hf*^" \ gj* ^rporaf
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CORPORATION
enforce t h e claim is not commenced withm five years after
(3) the corporation is without a registered agent or
the publication of the notice
(
registered office in this state,
(3) If t h e dissolved corporation publishes a newspaper nosec
(4) the corporation does not give notice to the division
removal
tice in accordance with Subsection (2), then unless sooner
((
t h a t its registered agent or registered office h a s been
barred u n d e r Section 16-10a-1406 or under any other statute
the
changed, that its registered agent has resigned, or t h a t its
its ar- limiting actions, t h e claim of any claimant against the dis*
dis<
registered office has been discontinued, or
solved corporation is barred unless the claimant commence^
(6) A
(5) the corporation's period of duration stated in its
an action to enforce the claim against the dissolved corporaby or
(<
^ articles of incorporation expires
1992
tion within five years after the publication date of t h e notice, ?/ j
a
S2?C JlMOa-1421. P r o c e d u r e for and effect of a d m m i s t r a against
(4) (a) For purposes of this section, "claim" means any
app
yp*%#
tive d i s s o l u t i o n .
a, or
claim, including claims of this state, whether known, due
r{l) If the division determines that one o r more grounds
tgent of
or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or
apst under Section 16 10a-1420 for dissolving a corporation, it
1992
unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal
**- shall mail the corporation written notice of
basis, or otherwise
^
(a) the division's determination that one or more
otifica(b) For purposes of this section, an action to enforce a
ft * 2$ grounds exist for dissolving; and
claim includes any civil action, and any arbitration under
¥%^£*^~
(b) the grounds for dissolving the corporation
i claims
16-10a-l
any agreement for binding arbitration between the dis$g£4m$® (a^ ^ ^ e corporation does not correct each ground for
(1) A i
bis secsolved corporation and the claimant
1992
ij%*j J| dissolution, or demonstrate to the reasonable satisfaction
16-10a-l
&f£riiLff °f the ^ l v l s l 0 n that each ground does not exist, within 60
known
16-10a-1408. E n f o r c e m e n t of c l a i m s a g a i n s t dissolved §
within t\
days after mailing the notice provided by Subsection (1),
e of the
corporations.
dehverin
t ^
^T the division shall administratively dissolve the corpora
ffective
A claim may be enforced
\
ment tha
tion
(a)
(1) under Section 16-10a 1406 or 16-10a-1407 against
(b) If a corporation is dissolved under Subsection (2)(a),
(b)
led in a
t h e dissolved corporation, to the extent of its undistribthe division shall mail written notice of the admmistra
date
uted assets, or
tive dissolution to the dissolved corporation, stating the
(0
of any
(2) against a shareholder of the dissolved corporation,
date of dissolution specified m Subsection (2)(d)
or ha
if t h e assets have been distributed in liquidation, but a
(c) The division shall mail a copy of the notice of
(d)
administrative dissolution to
lan 120
shareholder's total liability for all claims under this
bemg
ich the
section may not exceed the total value of assets distrib(I) the last registered agent of the dissolved
corpo
(e)
ration, or
uted to him, as t h a t value is determined at t h e time of
the
re
T state
(II) if there is no registered agent of record, a t least
distribution Any shareholder required to return any
(f)
?#
one officer of the corporation
I if not
portion of the value of assets received by him in liquids*
?
this c
tion shall be entitled to contribution from all other share* ^ f*?** ** (d) A corporation's date of dissolution is five days after
State
the date the division mails the written notice of dissolu
holders The contributions shall be m accordance with the -*
uniting
cable
tion under Subsection (2Kb)
shareholders' respective rights and interests and may not
rred if
(g)
(e) On the date of dissolution, any assumed names filed
exceed t h e value of the assets received in liquidation
ion (2)
<W
on behalf of the dissolved corporation under Title 42
oration
inSut
Chapter 2, Conducting Business Under an Assumed
(l)
Name,
are
canceled
l
16-10a-1409. S e r v i c e o n d i s s o l v e d c o r p o r a t i o n .
aimant
tqbei
(f) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(e), the name of the
(1) A dissolved corporation shall either
^ "^W0 days
(2) The
corporation t h a t is dissolved and any assumed names
(a) maintain a registered agent in this state to accept
for remsta
* claim
filed on its behalf are not available for two years from the
service of process on its behalf, or
(a) 1
)t com
date of dissolution for use by any other person
(b) be deemed to have authorized service of process 0»
nated*
0 days
(I) transacting business in this state, or
(b) .
it by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested
(II) doing business under an assumed name under
ing th«
to t h e address of its principal office, if any, as set forth in
)rpora
Title 42, Chapter 2, Conducting Business Under an
(3) Ifth
its articles of dissolution or as last changed by notice
by the
Assumed Name
statement
delivered to the division for filing or to the address jbr
(g) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(e), if the corpora
(1) and (2)
service of process that is stated in its articles of dissolu)tice to
tion that is dissolved is reinstated m accordance with
shall revok
tion or as last changed by notice delivered to t h e division
t affect
Section 16 10a 1422, the registration of the name of the
mail to the
for
filing
^*
by any
corporation and any assumed names filed on its behalf are
16 10a 142
(2) Service effected pursuant to Subsection (l)(b) is perreinstated back to the date of dissolution
(a) 1
lude a
fected at t h e earliest of
(3) (a) Except as provided m Subsection (3)(b), a corpora
(b) 1
urring
(a) t h e date the dissolved corporation receives %he
tion administratively dissolved under this section contin
(4) Whei
1992
process, notice, or demand,
ues its corporate existence but may not carry on any
the effecti
(b) t h e date shown on the return receipt, if signed on
business except
reinstatem
n.
behalf of t h e dissolved corporation, or
(a) <
(I) the business necessary to wind up and liquidate
disso
(c) five days after mailing
its business and affairs under Section 16 10a 1405
dissoh
st the
(3) Subsection (1) does not prescribe the only means, Of
and
trative
necessarily t h e required means, of service on a dissolved
(b) t
(II) to give notice to claimants in the
corporation
1992
anner
^ ^ * w xii wic m
maim
name
eneral
provided in Sections 16 10a 1406 and 16 10a 1407
admin
ation's
16-10a-1420. G r o u n d s for a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d i s s o l u t i o n
(b) If the corporation is reinstated m accordance with
> state,
The division may commence a proceeding u n d e r Sectiofi
16-10a-142
Section 16 10a 1422, business conducted by the corpora
16 10a 1421 for administrative dissolution of a corporation J*
If the di
tion during a period of administrative dissolution is
ed in a
(1) t h e corporation does not pay when they a r e due any
statement
unaffected by the dissolution
mst be
taxes, fees, or penalties imposed by this chapter or other
(4) The administrative dissolution of a corporation does not
tive dissoh
applicable laws of this state,
terminate the authority of its registered agent
the manne
tatute
(2) t h e corporation does not deliver a corporate of
(5) (a)
notice
tion to
Upon the administrative dissolution of a corpora
a n n u a l report to the division when it is due,
(1) s
tion, the division shall be an agent of the dissolved
tion, a]
corporation for purposes of service of process
)oard of
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id of t h e second calendar month following t h e calendar
tonth in which t h e report form is mailed by the division Proof
) the satisfaction of t h e division t h a t the corporation has
railed an a n n u a l report form is considered in compliance with
u s subsection
(5) If an a n n u a l report contains the information required by
his section, t h e division shall file it If a report does not
ontam the information required by this section, the division
hall promptly notify t h e reporting domestic or foreign corpoation in writing and r e t u r n the report to it for correction If
he report was otherwise timely filed and is corrected to
ontam the information required by this section and delivered
o t h e division within 30 days after t h e effective date of t h e
notice of rejection, the a n n u a l report is considered to be timely
filed
(6) The fact t h a t an individual's n a m e is signed on a n
annual report form is prima facie evidence for division purposes t h a t the individual is authorized to certify the report on
behalf of t h e corporation
(7) The a n n u a l report form provided by t h e division may be
designed to provide a simplified certification by the corpora
tion if no changes have been made m the required information
from t h e last preceding report filed
(8) A domestic or foreign corporation may, but may not be
required to, deliver to the division for filing an amendment to
its a n n u a l report reflecting any change in the information
contained in its a n n u a l report as last amended
1992
16-10a-1608. S t a t e m e n t of p e r s o n n a m e d a s director or
officer.
(1) Any person n a m e d as a director or officer of a domestic
or foreign corporation in an annual report or other document
on file with the division may if he does not hold t h e named
position, deliver to the division for filing a statement setting
forth
(a) his name,
(b) t h e domestic or foreign corporation's name,
(c) information sufficient to identify the report or other
document m which he is named as a director or officer,
and
(d) the date on which he ceased to be a director or
officer of t h e domestic or foreign corporation, or a state
ment t h a t h e did not hold the position for which he was
named m t h e corporate report or other document
1992
P A R T 17
TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS
16-10a-1701. A p p l i c a t i o n t o e x i s t i n g d o m e s t i c c o r p o r a tions.
Except as otherwise provided m Section 16 10a 1704, this
chapter applies to all domestic corporations m existence on
July 1, 1992, th&t were incorporated under any general
statute Of this state providing for incorporation of corporations
for profit, and to actions taken by the directors, officers, and
shareholders of such corporations after July 1,1992
1992
16-10a-1702. A p p l i c a t i o n t o f o r e i g n c o r p o r a t i o n s .
A foreign corporation authorized to transact business m this
state on J u l y 1, 1992, is subject to this chapter, but is not
required to obtain a new certificate of authority to transact
business under this chapter
1992
16-10a-1703. P u b l i c a t i o n .
The division shall annually publish copies of this chapter,
together with applicable annotations and commentary, for sale
and distribution to the public The division may charge a
reasonable amount for copies of the chapter sold or distrib
uted The proceeds from all sales and distributions shall be
deposited into the Commerce Service Fund, and may be
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appropriated to the division for u s e in defraying past or future
production, publication, republication, or distribution costs

Section
1641-5

1992

16-10a-1704. S a v i n g p r o v i s i o n s .
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), the repeal of any
statute by this act does not affect
(a) t h e operation of the statute or any action taken
under it before its repeal,
(b) any ratification, right, remedy, privilege, obligation,
or liability acquired, accrued, or incurred under t h e stafc*
ute before its repeal,
-*
(c) any violation of the statute, or any penalty, forfeiture, or punishment incurred because of the violation of
t h e statute before its repeal, or
(d) any proceeding, reorganization, or dissolution com
menced under the statute before its repeal, and any
proceeding, reorganization, or dissolution may be completed m accordance with the repealed statute as if the
statute h a d not been repealed
(2) If a penalty or punishment imposed for violation of a
statute repealed by this act is reduced by this act, the penalty
or punishment if not already imposed shall be imposed nt
accordance with this act
(3) The provisions of Subsection 16-10a-630(l) may not
operate to deny preemptive rights to shareholders who, immediately prior to July 1, 1992, were entitled to preemptive
rights by reason of the failure of the articles of incorporation of
the corporation of which they are shareholders to deny pr§*
emptive rights, and the corporation shall be treated for all
purposes as if its articles of incorporation included the state*
ment "the corporation elects to have preemptive rights," until
the date a resolution providing otherwise is approved by the same percentage of shareholders of each voting group as
would be required to include the resolution in an amendment
to t h e corporation's articles of incorporation Any preemptive
rights existing by virtue of Subsection (3) are subject to the
terms and provisions of Subsection 16-10a-630(2)
**
(4) The provisions of Section 16 10a-704 may not operate is
permit a corporation m existence prior to July 1,1992, to tak#
action by the written consent of fewer t h a n all of the share*
holders entitled to vote with respect to the subject matter ^1
t h e action, until the date a resolution providing o t h e r w i s e ^
approved either
(a) by a consent in writing, setting forth the proposed
resolution, signed by all of the shareholders entitled t&
vote with respect to the subject matter of the resolution
of
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16-10a-1705. Severability c l a u s e .
If any provision of this act, or the application of any
provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid* th#
remainder of this act is given effect without the invalid
provision or application
1" 2
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78-33-1.

J u r i s d i c t i o n of district c o u r t s — F o r m — Effect.
The district courts within their respective jurisdictions shall
have power to, declare rights, status, and other legal relations,
whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. No action
or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground t h a t a
declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration
may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect; and
such declaration shall have the force a n d effect of a final
judgment or decree.
1953
78-33-2.

R i g h t s , status, legal r e l a t i o n s u n d e r instrum e n t s or s t a t u t e s m a y b e d e t e r m i n e d .
Any person interested under a deed, will or written contract,
or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by
a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may
have determined any question of construction or validity
arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or
franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other
legal relations thereunder.
1953
78-33-3. C o n t r a c t s .
A contract may be construed either before or after there has
been a breach thereof.
1953
78-33-4. Suit b y fiduciary or r e p r e s e n t a t i v e .
Any person interested as or through an executor, administrator, trustee, guardian or other fiduciary, creditor, devisee,
legatee, heir, next of kin, or cestui que trust, in the administration of a trust, or of the estate of a decedent, an infant,
lunatic or insolvent, may have a declaration of rights or legal
relations jn respect thereto:
(1) to ascertain any class of creditors, devisees, legatees, heirs, next of kin or others; or,
(2) to direct the executors, administrators or trustees
-to do or abstain from doing any particular act in their
fiduciary capacity; or,
(3) to determine any question arising in the administration of the estate or trust, including questions of
construction of wills and other writings.
1953
78-33-5. Court's g e n e r a l p o w e r s .
T h e enumeration in Sections 78-33-2, 78-33-3 and 78-33-4
does not limit or restrict the exercise of the general powers
conferred in Section 78-33-1 in any proceeding where declaratory relief is sought, in which a judgment or decree will
terminate the controversy or remove an uncertainty.
1953
78-33-6. D i s c r e t i o n to d e n y declaratory relief.
The court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory
judgment or decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or
controversy giving rise to the proceeding.
1953

l-i

640

78-33-7. Appeals a n d r e v i e w s .
All orders, judgments and decrees under this chapter may
be reviewed as other orders, judgments and decrees.
1953
78-33-8. S u p p l e m e n t a l relief.
Further relief based on a,declaratory judgment or decree
may be granted whenever necessary or proper. The application therefor shall be by petition to a court having jurisdiction
to grant the relief. If the application is deemed sufficient, the
court shall, on reasonable notice, require any adverse party,
whose rights have been adjudicated by the declaratory judgment or decree, to show cause why further relief should not be
granted forthwith.
1953
78-33-9. Trial of i s s u e s of fact.
,*^
When a proceeding under this chapter involves t h e d e t e r l f
mination of an issue of fact, such issue may be tried and"
determined in the same manner as issues of fact are tried and
determined in other civil actions in the court in which the^
proceeding is pending.
1953^
78-33-10. Costs.
*£
In any proceeding under this chapter the court may makjtjk
such award of costs as may seem equitable and just.
J95if t
78-33-11. Parties.
When declaratory relief is sought all persons shall be mad<}$
parties who have or claim any interest which would bUf
affected by t h e declaration, and no declaration shall p r e j u d i c e
the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding. In a n ^ i "
proceeding which involves t h e validity of a municipal off^
county ordinance or franchise such municipality or coun%
shall be made a party, and shall be entitled to be heard, and if
a statute or state franchise or permit is alleged to be inval|4
the attorney general shall be served with a copy of tlj
proceeding and be entitled to be heard.
78-33-12. Chapter t o b e liberally construed.
This chapter is declared to be remedial; its purpose is |cfe
settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity witM
respect to rights, status and other legal relations; and is to b | &
liberally construed and administered.
" "
78-33-13. "Person" d e n n e d .
j |
The word "person" wherever used in this chapter, shall 6$
construed to mean any person, partnership, joint stock coi|
pany, unincorporated association or society, or municipal
other corporation of any character whatsoever.
l!
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Jurisdiction
Agency has jurisdiction to act on motion for
reconsideration after statutory 20-day presumptive denial period has passed. U.C.A.1953,
$3-46b-13(3)(b).
McCoy v. Utah Disaster
Kleenup, 2003, 65 P.3d 643, 467 Utah Adv. Rep.
23, 2003 UT App 49. Administrative Law And
procedure <s=* 483
. Statute deeming the State Tax Commission to
-haVe denied a motion not ruled upon within 20
" days of submission did not apply to motion for
reconsideration, and thus, Commission had jurisdiction to grant, four months after the motion
^was submitted, Collection Division's petition for
reconsideration of Commission's final decision
dismissing taxpayer from assessment action.
U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-13(3)(b). Prince v. Collection Div. of State Tax Com'n, 1999, 974 P.2d
284, 1999 UT 11. Taxation <&> 1085

8.

Appeal
Where State Tax Commission issued order on
taxpayers reconsideration request on January
15, taxpayer's appeal filed on February 12 was
timely, despite Commission's claim that motion
for reconsideration had been deemed denied
more than 30 days earlier.
U.C.A.1953,
63-46b-13(3)(b), 63-46b-14(3)(a). Knowledge
Data Systems v. Utah State Tax Com'n Auditing
Div., 1993, 865 P.2d 1387. Taxation <3> 1319
Appeal from order of Tax Commission filed
within 30 days of Tax Commission's denial of
petition for reconsideration was timely, even
though it was more than 30 days after the
petition was deemed denied by virtue of Commission's failure to make a timely ruling.
U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-13(3)(b). Orton v. Utah
State Tax Com'n, Collection Div., 1993, 864
P.2d904. T a x a t i o n ^ 493.3
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§ 63-46b-14.

Judicial review—Exhaustion of administrative remedies

(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action,
except in actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute.
, (2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative
remedies available, except that:
?/ ,

(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative remees if this chapter or any other statute states that exhaustion is not required;
) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement
to exhaust any or all administrative remedies if:
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable h a r m disproporionate to the public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion.

: (3)(a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action
Within 30 days after the date that the order constituting the final agency action
fe issued or is considered to have been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13
|3)(b).
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